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 The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition: 
Origin, Influence and Impact 
Kate Fearon

 
 
Abstract: The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) was a political party established in 1996 and 
dissolved in 2006, created to contest elections to the political peace negotiations that would result in the 
Belfast Agreement. Its later policies and actions, underscored by its three core principles of equality, 
inclusion and human rights were formulated and implemented in support of the Belfast Agreement. 
Drawing on their experience of activism in civil society and exclusion from mainstream political life, the 
NIWC seized the opportunity to successfully raise the issue of women in the formal political arena in 
order to shape the peace process. But what of its contribution to politics in Northern Ireland - and beyond 
- after the GFA, and what of its legacy after its dissolution?  
This article sketches the context of negotiations on ‘the constitutional question’ in which the 
NIWC emerged, says something of its experience in the political negotiations, points to its achievements 
in the inaugural Northern Ireland Assembly, and the implementation of the Belfast Agreement within and 
outwith those formal structures, identifying three main legacy areas of the NIWC that still shape the 
political landscape in Northern Ireland today, as well as one legacy area that informs and resonates with 
peace-building globally to this day. 
    Keyword: Women, Peacebuilding, Northern Ireland 
 
1  Background 
Northern Ireland has been contested political terrain since its establishment in 1921, but in the late 1960s 
protest movements around civil and human rights put pressure on those that supported the status quo - chiefly 
the British government, and the unionist political parties (who had held the majority government in Northern 
Ireland since the outset), to share power equitably. The initially peaceful civil rights movement gave way to a 
violent struggle, advocated by those who saw opportunity for a bigger strategic gain than the award of 
individual and collective human rights. From about 1970 onwards a violent paramilitary and military conflict 
was waged by those purporting to represent, variously, unionist and loyalist (those who wished to retain a 
union with Britain) and, nationalist and republican (those who wished to reunite with the rest of Ireland) 
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perspectives. 
By the mid-1990s, around 3,185 people had been killed and 38,711 injured in 35,058 shooting and 
17,021 bombing and/or incendiary device incidents
1
. Both the British and Irish governments, and the 
paramilitary organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) increasingly acknowledged that no-one was going 
to emerge the winner of the conflict through exclusively military means, often referred to as a "mutually 
hurting stalemate" (Zartman 2000:230). The governments thus sought a political settlement. 
It had not been for want of trying previously. In the most recent iteration of the conflict (from about 
1970), there had been four significant attempts at reaching a constitutional settlement. These were the 
Sunningdale Agreement in 1973, the Constitutional Convention in 1975-6, the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, 
the Brooke-Mayhew Talks in 1991-92
2
, a process that culminated in the Downing St. Declaration in 1993. The 
Downing St. Declaration was boosted by the declaration of an Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire in 
August 1994, followed in October 1994 by a ceasefire of the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC). 
These in turn laid the ground for a new talks initiative, convened by the British and Irish governments, and 
begun in 1996. 
Before turning to that initiative, it is worthwhile to recall that there had been little really new or 
transformative in terms of content on the constitutional question since the early seventies. The competing 
constitutional interests in Northern Ireland coalesced around three sets of relationships: firstly, the relationship 
between the two main communities – nationalist and unionist, frequently referred to in shorthand as Catholics 
and Protestants; secondly, the relationship between the political elites in Northern Ireland, be that in the form of 
a Government or an Executive, and the Government of Ireland, and indeed to a lesser extent, the relationship 
between the nationalist population in Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland – daubed the ‘North-
South’ dimension; and, thirdly, the relationship between the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
Government of Ireland – termed the ‘East-West’ dimension.  The table below illustrates the proposals put 
forward by State actors during a number of initiatives to at least manage, if not resolve, these sets of 
relationships, and the manner in which power might be distributed within and between the actors in each 
dimension. It demonstrates that substance- and approach-wise the initiatives have more in common than not, 
but also that context and timing played a part. 
                                                        
1 
Between 1969 and 1994, from Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI, 2003) 
statistics derived from Police Service of Northern Ireland tables reported on the CAIN website, namely -  Table NI-
SEC-05: Persons injured (number) due to the security situation in Northern Ireland (only), 1969 to 2003; Table NI-
SEC-06: Security related incidents (number) in Northern Ireland (only), shootings, bombings, and incendiaries, 1969 
to 2003; Table NI-SEC-04: Deaths (number) due to the security situation in Northern Ireland (only), 1969-2002. It 
should be noted that different indices of conflict related deaths and injuries are available. 
2
 The generally accepted timeframe is April 1991-November 1992, but in reality, Peter Brooke, as then Secretary of 
State had been engaged in talks with Unionists since early 1990, and certainly his November 1990 speech was a 
significant turning point. Furthermore, a separate, but linked process, the Hume-Adams Dialogue (on and off from 
1988-1996) was also significant, but, not being conducted by state actors per se, is not included in this list, or in the 
table below. As part of this Dialogue, in 1993, John Hume, leader of the nationalist SDLP and Gerry Adams, leader 
of the republican Sinn Fein, issued a joint statement proposing that the nationalist community had a right to self-
determination, but also that the unionist community had to be involved in any political accommodation. 
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Table 1:  Outline Constitutional Settlement Initiatives 
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       Sunningdale 
Agreement 
1973
3
 
Constitutional 
Convention 
1975 
Anglo-Irish 
Agreement 
1985 
Downing St. 
Declaration 
1993 
Belfast 
Agreement 
1998 
Strand 1 
Inside 
Northern 
Ireland 
Executive & 
Assembly 
Parliament &  
Government 
Executive  Relationships 
between 2 
communities 
Executive & 
Assembly 
Strand 2 
Ireland, North 
& South 
Council of 
Ireland 
(executive) 
Imposed 
institutional 
association 
with Ireland 
should be 
rejected 
Cross-border 
co-operation 
on social and 
economic 
issues 
Institutional 
recognition of 
special links 
between 
British & Irish 
peoples 
Ministerial 
Council 
(non-
executive) 
Strand 3 
The UK & 
Ireland/ Status 
of NI 
UK & IE 
declare no 
change in status 
of NI without 
majority 
consent 
(consent 
principle) 
External 
relations the 
preserve of UK 
Government 
Expanded role 
of Anglo-Irish 
Intergovern-
mental 
Council; 
consent 
principle 
Institutional 
recognition of 
special links 
between 
British & Irish 
peoples; 
consent 
principle 
British Irish 
Intergovern-
mental Council 
Policing in NI No change No change No change No change Review of 
Policing 
Criminal 
Justice 
No change No change No change No change Review of 
Crim. Just. 
E
x
tr
a-
C
o
n
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u
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E
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m
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Elections to 
negotiations 
No Yes No No Yes 
Women at the 
table 
No No Yes No Yes 
Paramilitary 
Ceasefires 
No Yes No No Yes 
 
Though tempting to assign a causal relationship between the presence of women at the table during the Belfast 
Agreement negotiations and a positive outcome, that is not the assertion here. Many factors were at play that 
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endowed the 1996 process with a different character: the existence and recognition of a mutually hurting 
stalemate between military, paramilitary and political protagonists; the paramilitary ceasefires; the direct 
engagement of the United States in the negotiation process; an agenda broader than constitutional 
arrangements; the decision to hold elections to determine delegates to the negotiating table, to name but a few.  
 However, what is asserted is that the different character of, and the different characters involved in, the 
1996-1998 process individually and collectively both changed the negotiating dynamic and the negotiation 
agenda and thus enhanced the opportunity for a resolution. 
 But we get ahead of ourselves. The single most important difference for women’s participation in the 
peace process was the governments’ decision to hold elections to determine who would be delegates to the 
negotiations. Both the fact of holding elections, and the electoral methodology were principally intended to 
ensure that representatives of paramilitary organizations (namely Sinn Féin, linked to the paramilitary IRA; the 
Progressive Unionist Party, linked to the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); and the Ulster 
Democratic Party, linked to the paramilitary Ulster Defence Association(UDA) would be enabled to send 
delegates to the negotiating table. The electoral system would see election to a 110-member 'Northern Ireland 
Forum' with 90 members elected directly from multi-seat constituencies and - the radical novelty - 20 'top-up' 
seats from the ten parties polling the most votes across the piece. This was given legal effect in the Northern 
Ireland (Entry to Negotiations) Act and was designed to be truly a multi-party and inclusive process, offering 
formal and arguably disproportionate participation based on relatively few votes. The Northern Ireland Forum
4
  
was essentially a Unionist plaything, a white elephant with neither tooth nor tusk, that met once a week during 
the course of the negotiations. But, from the ranks of those elected to the Forum the political parties were 
entitled to nominate their negotiating teams of three (for the bigger parties) or two members (for the smaller 
parties) each to the actual negotiations, which met three days a week when in session. Thus, not only was the 
system designed to enable a wider range of parties around the table, it also allowed those parties to carry almost 
equal weight, irrespective of the number of Forum seats it had won. 
 
2  Access and achievement in the peace negotiations 1996-1998 
In their consideration of the NIWC’s approach to the process of negotiation, Nolan-Haley and Hinds sum up 
the general situation in 1996 well: 
 
 “An abnormal and deviant political culture that indulged in antagonism, bullying, sectarian and 
sexist behavior had thrived during years of conflict and had become embedded as normal in the 
minds of politicians, the media and those working in the political arena. /…/ The language used 
had violent and militaristic overtones that corroded the democratic process.” (2003: 396). 
                                                        
4
 Formally titled the Northern Ireland Forum for Political Understanding and Dialogue. Informally it was referred 
to by many commentators as the Northern Ireland Forum for Political Misunderstanding and Monologue. 
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It was into this context that a group of women who had been activists and analysts in the academic, civil 
society and public and private business sector for years began to agitate. Initially they lobbied the existing 
political parties on women's political representation in the forthcoming political negotiations, to no avail. 
During this period, approximately February to April 1996, the Northern Ireland Women's European Platform 
(NIWEP, a Non-Governmental Organization) also lobbied the UK government civil servants who were 
designing the electoral system described above. In so doing, they had been informed – and inspired – by the 
Beijing Platform for Action, the outcome of the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women, held some 6 
months previously, in September 1995. In particular the conclusions on women and power and decision making, 
with their strategic objectives on access to and full participation in power structures resonated (United Nations, 
1995). The UK government's original draft named 15 political parties who would be permitted to contest the 
elections. This was not good enough for the NIWEP, which turned up the pressure on the government. Its 
members stated that the list was fundamentally undemocratic, and its leadership stated that space needed to be 
reserved for a women's 'caucus' or 'platform' on the ballot paper. The government listened, and, with only hours 
before the ballot papers were to go to print, asked for a name for this as yet unformed women's 'caucus' or 
'platform'; ‘Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC)’ was secured for the ballot paper (Fearon 1999). 
Following that, a political enterprise had to be established to support it.  
Subsequently, a number of meetings with women activists were held. On analyzing the proposed voting 
system more closely, they concluded that with around 10,000 votes across the whole of Northern Ireland, a 
party, even a new party, could get itself elected. On a practical level, if they could get 100 candidates and each 
of those 100 candidates got only 100 votes each, then it would be possible to get at least 2 women elected to the 
negotiations. This was only 6 weeks before the elections. There was thus little time for detailed policy 
reflection and definition - the campaign was a flurry of enthusiasm, intellect, organization and grit.  
However, three core principles – equality, inclusion and human rights – were struck early on. These 
principles acted as the guiding framework for short-term political positions and responses during the campaign 
while policy details were yet to be worked out and agreed. Later, all policies were developed around this 
framework. The women who made up the membership of the NIWC came from different political, religious 
and cultural backgrounds, but were united in their determination to use their own common experience of 
political exclusion to influence the agenda, shape the process, change the dynamic and impact the outcome.  
The NIWC ran under a campaign banner of 'Wave Goodbye to the Dinosaurs'. While 100 candidates 
with 100 votes each was the aim, in reality the NIWC ran 68 candidates and got 7,731 votes. It was not 10,000, 
but it was enough: the NIWC would be entitled to 2 delegates at the table – and a support team of 10. The two 
main NIWC delegates (those two candidates at the top of the electoral list) to the talks were from a nationalist 
and a unionist background, and, when it came to nominating members for sub-committees, the NIWC was 
careful to always have representatives from both unionist and nationalist background at the table. 
Over the next two years at the negotiating table, and in the corridors outside it, the NIWC had to 
develop a thick skin, as some male participants, particularly on the mainstream unionist side, questioned – with 
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varying degrees of sexism and sarcasm – their right to be part of the negotiations. This was particularly the case 
with the Forum, where the lack of adult supervision (in the form of any UK or Irish Government 
representatives) meant a free rein on the verbal abuse. The NIWC representatives were described as ‘feckless’ 
with ‘limited intellect’ (Robinson 1997); as the ‘hen party’ and as ‘traitor’s’ to Unionism, while continuously 
enduring what the media termed bully-boy tactics (Fearon 1999) and chauvinistic abuse (Murtagh 2008). 
 
3  Shaping the Agreement 
However, though having to endure these slights and this sexism, the NIWC team succeeded in carving out a 
niche for itself, making a unique and valuable contribution to the negotiations. The Taoiseach (Prime Minister) 
of Ireland who presided over the peace negotiations acknowledged the contribution of the NIWC, speaking of 
the ‘outstanding contribution of the Women’s Coalition, who, without the benefit of a party network, resources 
or administration, bravely stood their ground, stated their case and insisted gently on being heard.’ (O’Regan 
1998). The British Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam, speaking in the House of Commons stated that the NIWC 
had been a ‘positive force’ in the process (Cowell-Meyers 2014).  
The NIWC contributed to the negotiating process – and the resultant political Agreement - in four main 
ways:  
 
(1) being concerned about process and relationships between the actors in the negotiations and also 
communication channels between the negotiations process and members of the wider community (Fearon 
1999; Nolan-Hayley and Hinds 2003) 
(2)  the production of high-quality, community-consulted policy positions (Fearon 1999) 
(3) keeping the process inclusive, thus arguing against the exclusion of Sinn Féin and the smaller Unionist 
parties when they were suspended due to ceasefire violations at various times (Fearon 1999; Nolan-Hayley and 
Hinds 2003); and 
(4) expanding the agenda beyond the traditional constitutional negotiating agenda to include a number of other 
matters (Fearon 1999; Barnett Donaghy 2004; Cowell-Meyers 2014), which ended up in the final text of the 
Belfast Agreement, under the Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity section  
 
In relation to this last, some prominent examples are as follows: 
•"Against the background of the recent history of communal conflict" (this was NIWC language used directly 
in the chapeau to the whole section as well) the parties affirmed "in particular" the "right of women to full 
and equal political participation"; "the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, 
regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity" 
• The UK government committed to introduce public policy for promoting social inclusion including 
community development and the advancement of women in public life 
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•Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights in domestic legislation5 
•Establishment of a Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, and a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland6 
•A new obligation on public authorities to conduct their functions with due regard to the need to promote 
equality of opportunity, and to provide for equality of treatment of both communities 
•Provisions to acknowledge the rights of and address the suffering of victims of violence 
•Provisions to address reconciliation and the promoting mutual understanding about the past 
•The right to freedom from sectarian harassment and to freely choose one's place of residence. (Northern 
Ireland Office 1998). 
 
Though not part of its core agenda, the NIWC also supported the provisions on prisoners. The inclusion of 
these provisions was also a break from past initiatives to resolve the seemingly intractable conflict.  
None of this is to say that the NIWC did not also contribute on the more explicitly constitutional 
arrangements: it did, including on a novel proposal for a Civic Forum, and on the decommissioning of 
paramilitary weapons issue also. But that ground was heavily dominated by the traditional 'constitutional' 
parties, and so it was the basket of rights-based issues detailed above that the NIWC prioritized, championed 
and provided much of the language for. Thus, as Barnett Donaghy concludes, the NIWC shaped not only the 
peace agreement, but the subsequent political landscape: “the NIWC did substantially impact on the political 
culture [by] ‘facilitat[ing] the expansion of Northern Ireland’s traditional definition of equality to go beyond 
religion to include other aspects, such as gender.” (Barnett Donaghy 2004: 29; Bell, Campbell, Ni Aolain 2004). 
 
4  An Increased Presence of Women in Public Life 
The masculinized nature of the society in conflict in Northern Ireland has been most succinctly described as an 
‘armed patriarchy’ (Harkin, cited in McWilliams 1995: 15), but the conservative, masculinized and marital 
values, and the dominant discourses of nationalism, religion and conflict that underpinned the society and 
located the ‘natural’ position of women as mothers, wives and other variants of helpmeet which reinforced 
male privilege have also been well-attested to (Wilford 1999; Ward 2002 2004; Barnett Donaghy 2004; 
Murtagh 2008; Braniff and Whiting 2015). Electorally, this manifested in a very low electoral representation of 
women in Northern Ireland since the inception of the state: in Braniff and Whiting’s (2015) words, Northern 
Ireland was ‘nearly bereft’ of female representation in the Home Rule (1921-72) and the Direct Rule (1972-
1998) periods. Ward (2004) notes that despite female party membership levels of up to 50% (UUP) or 60% 
(DUP) only 5% of the 1973 Assembly Members, and only 5% of the delegates to the 1975 Constitutional 
Convention were women. While there is a tendency to see the problem of gender representation as ‘more acute 
                                                        
5
 Also lobbied for by SDLP, SF, PUP 
6
 Also lobbied for by SDLP, SF, PUP; Also – approximately -  in prior initiatives, e.g. Constitutional Convention 
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within the unionist parties’, with the ‘debilitating impact of evangelicalism’ (Braniff and Whiting 2015: 93103) 
given as at least a part-explanation of this, and that nationalist parties have generally fielded more women 
candidates (Ward 2004) it is also the case that none of the women delegates to the 1975 Constitutional 
Convention came from the nationalist parties. To be fair to the nationalist parties, it has been calculated that 
between 1998 and 2011 it the “combined number of female nationalist members of the Legislative Assembly 
(42) is more than double that of the two unionist parties (17).” (Braniff and Whiting 2015: 99). 
Wilford (1999: 77) notes that the 1997 parliamentary elections in the UK – a landmark election for 
women’s representation with the highest-ever number of women MPs (120) elected - resulted in Northern 
Ireland having the ‘dubious distinction’ of being the only region of the UK without any women at Westminster. 
Barnett Donaghy (2004: 26) states that after the peace process, “the new political landscape has become more 
open and conducive to promoting women into positon of political power”, and that the NIWC’s experience in 
the talks process enabled women to demonstrate their capabilities to the public, something augmented by 
women elected to the new Assembly, who provided the “first legislative role models for Northern Irish women 
in over 30 years” (2004: 31).  
Cowell-Meyers writing in the context of ‘contagion theory’ supports this view, asserting that, though 
the “direct effects were narrow” the existence of the NIWC “improved women’s representation in nearly all 
other political parties in the system” (2011: 411),, by putting pressure on them to promote women within their 
own structures. She notes specifically that while there was no reference to women’s participation in the 1996 
campaign literature, by the next election cycle there was “an explosion of interest” (2011: 70): the SDLP, UUP 
and DUP all produced campaign documents on women after the formation of the NIWC. 
There is no doubt but that the most immediate and most clearly visible impact of the NIWC was on the 
descriptive representation of women in public life; its creation and subsequent efforts in the talks catalyzed the 
more meaningful participation of women in other parties (Barnett Donaghy 2004; Cowell-Meyers 2011 2014; 
Foster 1997). The most immediate local effect could be seen in seating arrangements at the negotiations: when 
the NIWC first sat at the negotiating table, they were the only women from the political parties so to do. When 
the Belfast Agreement was signed two years later, there were women at the table from other political parties as 
well (Fearon 1999). And it was not just at the negotiating table – numbers of elected women elected above 
Council level increased.  
Against all the odds, in 1998, the NIWC won two seats in the inaugural Northern Ireland Assembly. 
There have been 349 MLAs in total between 1998 and 2016 inclusive. Of these, 80 were women. Women 
therefore comprised 23% of the total number of MLAs during that period.  
Taken as an average across the first four elections (1998, 2003, 2007, 2011), women have comprised 
around 16% of elected MLAs. The 2016 election, when women MLAs made up 28% of all MLAs, resulted in 
an increase of almost 50% from 2011. Potter (2016) has found suggests that there is greater turnover of female 
than male MLAs: women tend to sit for shorter periods than men, as they are more likely to serve a single term 
and men are more likely to serve three or more terms.  
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The table
7
 below outlines the number and percentage of women in each of the first five Assemblies, 
presented beside the number and percentage of women at the negotiating table on the first day. It is not strictly 
speaking comparing like with like, but it is illustrative nonetheless: 
 
Table2: Women Members and Ministers of the Northern Ireland Assembly 1996-2016 
 May  
1996 
Talks 
May 
1996 
Forum 
June 1998 
Assembly 
Nov. 2003 
Assembly 
March 2007 
Assembly 
May 2011 
Assembly 
May 2016 
Assembly 
Women 
Members 
2 
8% 
15 
13.6% 
14 
7.7% 
18 
16.7% 
18 
16.7% 
20 
18.5% 
30 
27.7% 
Women 
Ministers 
N/A N/A 0 
0.0 %  
(later 3, 
33%) 
Executive 
suspended 
4 
30% 
4 
30% 
3 
30% 
 
No women were appointed to the first Executive as Ministers in 1998. The NIWC, not being afraid to 'name 
and shame' on this matter, publicly highlighted the absence of women in leadership positions in the Assembly, 
in both domestic and international media. And, over time, 3 women Ministers were appointed (from nationalist 
parties) in the course of the first Assembly. 
While it is arguably not difficult to appear competent when some of your fellow Ministers reject the 
theory of evolution, by and large the women who have been Ministers in the Assembly are held to have been 
competent, with around a third of Ministerial posts going to women. In the inaugural Assembly there were 
three women Ministers, in the second Assembly there were none (due to the suspension of the Executive), in 
the third and fourth Assemblies there were four, and of course the previous First Minister was a woman. 
8
 
While it is patently impossible to attribute a causal relationship between the number of women 
Ministers appointed to the inaugural Assembly, and the existence of the NIWC, what can be asserted is this: the 
presence of the NIWC in the negotiations, the way it spoke about constitutional issues, the unique agenda items 
it proposed and championed, and its presence in the media outside of the negotiations and during the Assembly 
created a climate in which women’s political participation was firmly part of the new political landscape. The 
NIWC demonstrated that women would vote for other women, that women could constitute competent political 
leadership, and its presence resulted in an environment in which it became politically unacceptable for 
mainstream parties not to appoint women to senior positions thereafter. And women from both sides of the 
political side agreed. For example, Dawn Purvis, later leader of the Progressive Unionist Party stated that 
“What the NIWC did was actually prove that the public do vote for women” and Patricia Lewsley, an SDLP 
MLA was clear that the “NIWC highlighted the issue of women in politics, or the lack of it” (Cowell-Meyers 
2014: 71). Even women UUP party members who didn’t like the NIWC used their resentment of it being 
                                                        
7
 Top row is from Potter, Michael, Women in the Northern Ireland Assembly, 2016 
8
 Ministers who were in charge of running departments – the figures thus exclude women who held Junior 
Ministerial positions. 
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flagged as the only party working for women, to create policy change within the UUP (Walker 2000). And 
Arlene Foster, the first female First Minister admits that “The lack of women active in political life in Northern 
Ireland was an issue which really came to the fore in the Forum elections of 1996.” (Cowell-Meyers 2011: 418). 
Thus, while the degree to which the NIWC increased women’s political participation in Northern 
Ireland may be debatable, what is clear, as Stryker, McGuire and White assert is that “The real transformation 
in the role of women in Northern Ireland began in 1996 with the formation of [the] Women’s Coalition.” (cited 
in Cowell-Meyers 2011: 418), and that it was a “milestone for female political leadership” (Braniff and 
Whiting 2015: 98). In a later article, Cowell-Meyers concludes that “though the representation of women has 
not changed dramatically, it is clear that patterns began to shift in the mid-1990s, just after the NIWC was 
formed.” (2014: 69). 
In the second elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly, in November 2003, however, with the 
traditional parties dominating, and the NIWC in opposition, saw the NIWC lose both its seats. In effect it was 
squeezed out by increased polarization and extremization (Murtagh 2008; Braniff and Whiting 2015; Bell et al. 
2004; interview with former Irish Government Minister 2017). It still had a number of Council seats (on two 
Councils), but, by 2006, it no longer had those. The party held a convention in May, almost 10 years to the day 
since it was first elected, to formally dissolve itself.  
 
5  Influencing the Assembly 
To step back from the numerical representation of women, the process of implementing the Belfast Agreement 
was long and demanding, with several periods of formal suspension (on full pay), and several periods of very 
low productivity. Within the first Assembly, the NIWC continued to play a key role. It took forward its original 
agenda on the rights and equality parts of the Agreement, and made substantial contributions to the reviews on 
Policing and Criminal Justice, submitting orally and in writing. It also made a substantial submission to the 
Victims Commission.  
The Belfast Agreement contained the capacity to truly transform the political narrative from a zero-sum, 
win-lose game to a win-win.  The trouble was, however, that though it was win-win, it was a narrow win: the 
winners never went beyond the political elites. In this, the Belfast Agreement created a permanent, top-heavy 
Executive, in which around 90% of political parties to the Assembly were always represented. A key factor in a 
mature democracy is a constructive opposition
9
. In the first Assembly the NIWC was it.  
Though with only 2 out of 108 MLAs, the NIWC was able to highlight issues and confound the 
                                                        
9 As indeed, somewhat ironically, the 1975 Constitutional Convention Report recommended, on members of the 
opposition being awarded Privy Council places (para. 40); the UUUC proposed that 'opposition be effective; 
otherwise there would be no accountability in any meaningful sense' (para. 89 (2) (i)) and 'It does this to strengthen 
Parliament vis-à-vis the executive and to make opposition more effective. This is in keeping with the highest 
traditions of British Parliamentary democracy which in the beginning acted basically as a curb upon Monarch and 
Nobles. It is also a development of the committee system which has existed.' (para. 97).  Northern Ireland 
Convention Report, HMSO 1975. 
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Executive parties on many occasions. For example, NIWC MLAs infuriated all parties early in the Assembly 
when they indicated their intent to subvert a rule on designated politico-national identity. The requirement was 
that every Assembly Member had to publicly declare their designation – as Unionist, Nationalist or Other (just 
in case there was any doubt).  This was to ensure sufficient cross-community consensus in a number of 'key 
national interest' votes. NIWC members stated that both their MLAs would designate as either Nationalist or 
Unionist, depending on the issue. This would therefore give them more clout – their votes wouldn’t effectively 
cancel each other out. This was a surprise, as most MLAs thought that the NIWC would designate as 'Other' 
(and therefore not be counted in cross-community votes).  
The furor however spoke to a more fundamental, almost teleological, issue. In being prepared to play 
fast and loose with communal identity, the basic organizing principle of the polity, the NIWC challenged the 
received truth that national identity was privileged above all others, and furthermore, that it was fixed and 
immutable. To suggest that identity was not only fluid, but that it was elective – that choice could be involved, 
and that the NIWC did not intend either to be defined by national identity or be boxed-in by it was something 
that shook the new/old establishment. But it was not to be: the Speaker of the Assembly issued a ruling stating 
that the designation could not be changed, thus blocking the NIWC’s flexibility in this respect. 
However, the MLAs were innovative in other ways, as highlighted by Cowell-Meyers (2011) who 
points to the NIWC’s role in creating the momentum for the establishment of family-friendly working hours in 
the assembly and a Commissioner for Children and Young People. In respect of the Commissioner, they were 
the first party, for instance, to draft and submit a Private Members Bill to the Assembly
10
. This was voted down, 
but later taken up by another party (SDLP), with the result that a Children's Rights Commissioner Bill was 
passed, in similar initial terms as the NIWC draft. As well as this, the NIWC held the position of Deputy 
Speaker, and thus played a role in managing the Assembly plenary sessions. 
 
6  Victims’ Rights and Dealing with The Past 
But it was on another part of the political agenda that the NIWC had expanded in the Belfast Agreement that 
was to prove far-reaching in subsequent years. Prior to 1997, there was no meaningful provision for the rights 
of victims or survivors, nor, unsurprisingly, for transitional justice, or ‘dealing with the past’. Neither was there 
much written or theorized about these matters. Since the passage of the Belfast Agreement, the field has 
quickly developed (Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 2013): much has been written, and much 
discussed, but little further has been agreed.  
Several scholars have dismissed the GFA provisions on victims and survivors as being of little 
significance, of being “silent”, of having “side-stepped” or of not being detailed enough about the complex and 
complicated matter of dealing with the past (Ahmed et al. 2016:528; McGrattan 2015: 936; Lundy and 
Mcgovern 2008; Quirk 2015; Hamber and Kelly 2016).  
                                                        
10 This was written by the author. 
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While it is true that there was no explicit mechanism for example, on a truth-recovery institution, or a 
space in which to share testimony in the Belfast Agreement, others allow for a more nuanced view of the 
language (Bell 2016), and the context (Hamber 2003; Rolston 2006; Ashe 2015) acknowledging that the 
realistic possibility of reaching agreement on ‘the past’ in 1998 was less than zero. The frequently researched 
and reported sense of the politicization or potential politicization of the ‘dealing with the past agenda’, and of 
the asymmetrical fear of it from the unionist community in particular (Rolston 2006; Lawther 2012; Simpson 
2013; House of Commons 2015) add to the sensitivity of the context when it was discussed as part of the peace 
process in 1998.  
Bell argues cogently that while there was no formal mechanism, a closer examination of the provisions 
on prisoners, victims and survivors suggested these acted as proxies for progressing ‘the past’ agenda. This 
“piecemeal” approach, while not without flaw, formed the foundations for “post-agreement initiatives
11
, such 
as those on victims and prisoners, [to] continue to build on the Agreement’s provisions.” (2003: 1116).  
It is averred here that Bell’s basic analysis is correct: that the provisions on victims and survivors 
represented the maximum politically possible at the time, but they acted as building blocks on which to build 
post-Belfast Agreement work on dealing with the past. And they were almost not included in the Belfast 
Agreement.  
When the first draft of the Agreement was circulated to the parties by the negotiation Chairperson, it 
contained only a small paragraph on victims, in part because the NIWC had been putting it on the agenda 
throughout the process. The NIWC sought counsel outside the talks for the right language to insert, and lobbied 
other parties to include an amendment to the text. When the next draft was issued, however, what little 
language there was on victims had disappeared. The NIWC then “had to push hard to get a new, extended 
version back in.” (Fearon 1999: 112), including a direct lobby to the British Secretary of State. This was 
successful and thus the language remained in the Agreement.  
The emphasis on victims' rights and the reconciliation agenda of which the NIWC was a strong, and on 
occasion unique, champion in the negotiating process turned out to be much more significant than any of the 
participants – including the NIWC delegates –imagined.  
From speaking to victims - all victims - throughout the negotiation process, the NIWC understood that 
the issue of victims would need much greater political attention. In not exploiting victims for political gain, but 
in understanding that the situation of victims was not only personal, but also a symbol of division and 
symptomatic of greater malaise, the NIWC language in the Belfast Agreement provided hope to those who had 
endured physical and psychological pain for years, sometimes decades. But it was not without criticism. 
The NIWC advocated for an 'all victims' (not just 'our victims') approach. This meant that its proposals 
would equally apply to those who were victims of paramilitary attacks and State attacks alike. This was very 
                                                        
11
 Consideration of these are beyond the scope of this article, but government- or quasi-government sponsored 
initiatives such as the 2001 Healing Through Remembering project; the 2006 St. Andrew’s Agreement; the 2006 
Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order; the 2010 Hillsborough Agreement;  the 2009 Consultative Group on 
the Past, the 2011 Cohesion, Sharing, Integration consultation; the 2014 Stormont House Agreement; the work on 
the Bill of Rights over the years, the ongoing Eolas Project, An Crann/The Tree all form part of this canon. 
Hiroshima Journal of Peace Vol.1 
March, 2018 
 13 
difficult for many people to accept. The pre-existing narrative had been that 'innocent' victims (e.g. victims of 
paramilitary attacks) were entitled to rights, but more 'guilty' victims (e.g. members of paramilitary 
organizations who had been injured or killed by other paramilitary groupings, or the army, the police, or even 
themselves) were not deserving. This position was criticized by some individual victims. However, it was not 
only the right thing to do, but the politically astute thing to do. This was not least because issue of 'victims and 
prisoners', became in fact 'victims vs. prisoners' throughout the campaign before the Referendum on the 
Agreement was held. It is averred that, had the NIWC not insisted on rights for victims there would have been 
little or no counterweight to the rights for prisoners’ clauses, the referendum would not have been endorsed by 
such a solid majority of 71% (Fearon 1999: 113). 
However, in the twenty years since the Agreement was approved by popular vote these issues (referred 
to at the time as ‘soft’ rights-based issues, as opposed to the ‘hard’ issues around the constitutional 
arrangements) have emerged as the most difficult ones to resolve. 
It is significant that many of the high-level interventions to support the implementation of the Belfast 
Agreement after 2003 have related to these matters (and here policing is included). What has now become 
known as the 'dealing with the past agenda' – justice for victims, reconciliation, acknowledgment as to what 
actually happened, what the conflict was all about, continues to hamper implementation. In the words of former 
First Minister Peter Robinson, when speaking of the three difficult issues of parades, flags and the past: “There 
is progress that can be made in all three areas, more in parades than in flags, and more in flags than in dealing 
with the past.” (Moriarty 2013). In other words, dealing with the past remains the most difficult area to address. 
But it is, as the NIWC correctly foresaw, vital for all parties (State and non-State actors) to the conflict 
not just to agree on constitutional instruments to administer power. In order to ‘move on’, it is vital to have a 
shared understanding of how that power was once distributed and, at times, abused to the detriment of 
individuals and communities (Bell 2003; Hamber 2003). It is vital to acknowledge right and wrong and to make 
amends. This failure, not to blame, but to agree facts and accept responsibility for past actions, has long dogged 
the implementation process. This has been recognized internationally important, because, at one time, as the 
below citation demonstrates, the Government (1975) could not even describe, yet alone define 'The Problem' 
properly. 
    "A further aspect of the historical past is also highly relevant to the present task of constitution 
making. This is the history of the Ulster community’s relations with its nearest neighbour. In the 
Government’s White Paper of July, 1974, entitled "The Northern Ireland Constitution" (Cmnd. 
5675), there is a Part devoted to "The Problem". In this there is no mention of the Irish Republic. 
Relations with the State which shares the same island with Northern Ireland are, however, an 
important factor in Northern Ireland’s problem."    
 
Today, we have a British government that has funded an Inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday, and offered 
a formal apology for it, and indeed for the Irish Famine. Mechanisms for individual victims' compensation and 
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social welfare support have been established. They are not perfect, but they exist. Yet agreement on 'the past': 
what happened, never mind why it happened, what we can learn from it; justice or at least information and 
acknowledgement for victims; integration of ex-combatants; general political reconciliation remains elusive, as 
the Haas Report concluded in 2013 and as referenced again in the Stormont House Agreement (2015). 
In addition, as several scholars have pointed out, the gendered nature of transitional justice must be 
taken into account (Bell et al. 2004; Ward 2013; Ashe 2015; Braniff and Whiting 2015; Ahmed et al. 2015), 
highlighting, inter alia, the exclusion of women from negotiations on ‘the past’. Ward highlights the exclusion 
of women from the Community, Sharing and Integration consultation paper issued by the Office of the First 
Minister and Deputy First Minister, seeing a backlash against women’s agency; Braniff and Whiting state, in 
relation to the Haas-O’Sullivan talks (that led to the Stormont House Agreement) that the process was 
“Described by women’s groups as flawed from the outset because they minimized the contribution of women 
in the development of the process.” (2015: 102). Ahmed et al. are rightly critical of the absence of gendered 
transitional justice arrangements, finding that Northern Ireland is sub-par on the international scale, without 
even a “rhetorical commitment to women’s inclusion” (2015: 533).  
In this, unfortunately, it almost brings us full-circle to the situation that motivated the NIWC to be 
established in the first place: it is important that women are at the table during political negotiations; it is 
important that language reflecting gendered experience is included in political agreements, and it is important 
that women’s positions, and language is championed during the implementation phase of political agreements.  
In terms of considering if the NIWC has long-term impact, this issue can be considered as a case-study. 
But is the ‘glass half-full’ or the ‘glass half-empty’? Well, both, probably. The glass is half-full in that the fact 
that there was a hook on which to hang further work on ‘the past’ speaks to the NIWC’s influence in the 
political process in the first place. It’s half-empty in that, almost 20 years later, even with 30% of female MLAs, 
and post-Agreement multiple policy documents on women from all political parties, even the most conservative 
ones, other women’s groups have had to come together as women and speak up when the exclusion was 
particularly egregious (as the Legacy Gender Integration Group did in this instance). This suggests that the 
formal NIWC impact over time was more limited. It demonstrates starkly that women’s meaningful 
participation has to be about more than the number of women elected. Numbers are important, yes, but they 
cannot be the end of the story.  
 
7  Wider afield - sharing the experience, informing and influencing globally 
The final legacy area of the NIWC is its international work. At the outset, many think tanks, women's groups, 
academics and peace processes became interested in the NIWC experience. In particular, mainly simply due to 
timing, links were made between the South African and Israeli-Palestinian processes, with formal exchanges of 
the principal actors in each. The relationships developed between NIWC negotiators and Palestinian women 
negotiators in particular proved most durable. Mutual moral support, exchange of information, 'fresh eyes' 
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analysis in terms of bringing solutions to the respective tables were the fundaments of this relationship. 
In the initial 5 years of the NIWC, funding was greatly assisted by women academics and activists, and 
women and men philanthropists, and simply interested parties in the United States, and NIWC representatives 
would frequently make the trip, especially to the East Coast, but also to the West Coast, to do speeches and 
fundraising events, seminars and conferences, and share the experience of the NIWC inside the negotiations. 
Those networks endure to this day. 
International interest in the NIWC has remained high, despite its dissolution, and it is not uncommon 
for members of the original NIWC Negotiations Team to continue to give interviews to research students and 
to share the lessons learned with policy makers. In 2017 two documentaries on the NIWC are in production. It 
is estimated that the NIWC currently responds to around 10 speaker requests per year, and has done so for 20 
years now. There are also requests to inform and advise on other political or peace processes, sometimes 
formally and sometimes informally through Track Two diplomatic or NGO channels. For example, in the past 
5 years, on both gender and process/relationship axes, the NIWC has advised the UN-facilitated talks on Syria 
held in Geneva, the Columbian peace process in Bogota, the Kurdish-Turkish process in Eastern Turkey, the 
Mindanao process in the Philippines, and also at various times women’s and other NGOs in East Timor, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Israel-Palestine. 
 And, just as the NIWC itself relied on the experience of other women, for example in the Guatemalan 
and South African peace processes to inform its work, so other women's organisations and generalist NGOs 
have used the experience of the NIWC to inform, and in certain cases, influence theirs, in many different 
geopolitical contexts. 
 
8  Conclusions 
Bringing a different, feminist perspective to the political negotiations, having the foresight to lobby for 
women’s meaningful participation and then being prepared to respond to a vacuum in a very practical way 
characterized the inception phase of the NIWC. Innovation, ingenuity and inclusion were key characteristics. 
Its vision - and practical implementation - of actively reaching across party lines within the negotiations and 
continually engaging with communities of interest and the general public outwith the negotiations continued 
this approach during the political talks.  
Its capacity to absorb sexism, exemplified not least as a questioning of their very right to be at the table, 
and to contribute coherently and competently meant that women in other political parties had greater leverage 
to gain greater representation for women within their party structures, and, consequently in the Northern 
Ireland Assembly.  
Pressure from the NIWC on the issue of women’s political representation led to a situation where it is 
now normal to see women in public life, including at Ministerial level, and at a rate of 28% (in 2016, an 
increase of around 50% from the 20 women elected as MLAs in 2011), on par with the Westminster rate of 
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29% (Keen and Cracknell 2016). 
But increased numerical representation of women, which is the clearest long-term impact of the NIWC 
is not, of itself, enough. Women not only need to be elected, they need to be prepared to propose and handle 
policy through a gendered lens, drawing on domestic and international frameworks so to do, as the NIWC did. 
The continued exclusion of women from meaningful political negotiations, such as on transitional justice speak 
to the limitations of the NIWC having dissolved.  
However, the NIWC's ability to - presciently - expand and deepen the political agenda, on touchstone 
issues such as victims’ rights, integrated education, and women’s rights, and to champion them was a unique 
contribution to the process, and laid the ground on which to build further initiatives, in particular the dealing 
with the past agenda. In this, it not only changed the content of the Belfast Agreement, but reshaped the 
contours of the political landscape ever since.  
Finally, though having been in existence for only 10 years, NIWC members have been sought out for 
information on its experience, and advice on other political processes and procedures, most significantly the 
political or peace processes in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, and Columbia. Thus internationalism has become a 
strong legacy area for this audacious group of women, who, in 1996 felt so strongly that a paucity of women in 
political life would result in a proposed constitutional settlement that would only ape the earlier versions, and 
not truly include the ‘something for everybody’ that, in the end, was the key to its acceptance by a large 
majority of Northern Irish citizens, and thus meant an end to a militarized phase in this long, seemingly 
intractable, conflict.  
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